Indian Penal Code & Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita - Quick Reference

Overview

Chapter IV of the IPC (Sections 76-106) and corresponding provisions of the BNS provide general exceptions or defences that can exonerate a person from criminal liability even when the actus reus of an offence is established. The burden of proving an exception generally lies on the accused under Section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act (now Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam), though the standard is merely "preponderance of probability" and not "beyond reasonable doubt."

1. Mistake of Fact (Section 76 & 79 IPC / Sections 14 & 17 BNS)

Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law, in good faith believes himself to be bound by law or justified by law to do it. Example: A soldier fires on a mob under orders from his superior, believing in good faith that the order is lawful. A mistake of law, however, is no defence ("ignorantia juris non excusat").

2. Judicial Acts (Section 77 IPC / Section 15 BNS)

Nothing is an offence which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law. This protects judicial officers acting within their jurisdiction or under a bona fide belief of jurisdiction.

3. Acts Done Under Compulsion or Threats (Section 94 IPC / Section 28 BNS)

A person who is compelled by threats to do an act which would otherwise be an offence is excused, provided the act does not amount to murder or an offence against the state punishable with death. The threat must be of instant death to the person and must be a continuing threat at the time of the act. Mere duress of a general nature is insufficient.

4. Act of a Child (Section 82-83 IPC / Sections 20-21 BNS)

Nothing is an offence done by a child under seven years of age (doli incapax - incapable of crime). A child above seven and under twelve years is also exempt if it is shown that the child had not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of the act. This reflects the principle that criminal responsibility requires a certain level of mental maturity.

5. Insanity / Unsoundness of Mind (Section 84 IPC / Section 22 BNS)

Nothing is an offence done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law. This is based on the M'Naghten Rules. The key question is whether the accused knew the nature and quality of the act and whether he knew it was wrong. Temporary insanity caused by voluntary intoxication does not qualify (Section 85-86 IPC / Sections 23-24 BNS).

6. Intoxication (Sections 85-86 IPC / Sections 23-24 BNS)

Involuntary intoxication (administered without knowledge or against will) is a defence, treated similarly to unsoundness of mind. Voluntary intoxication is NOT a defence. However, when an offence requires a "specific intent" or "knowledge," voluntary intoxication may be relevant to negate that specific intent in some circumstances. Section 86 creates a presumption that a voluntarily intoxicated person has the same knowledge as an unintoxicated person.

7. Consent (Sections 87-91 IPC / Sections 25-27 BNS)

An act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done with the consent of a person above 18 years, is not an offence by reason of any harm it may cause. Consent given by a person under fear of injury, misconception of fact, unsoundness of mind, intoxication, or by a child under 12 years is not valid consent. Medical treatment done in good faith for the benefit of a person, even without express consent, is protected.

8. Trifling Acts (Section 95 IPC / Section 29 BNS)

Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it.

9. Necessity and Private Defence (Sections 96-106 IPC)

The right of private defence is treated in a separate chapter of these notes due to its importance and complexity.

10. Communication Made in Good Faith (Section 93 IPC / Section 27 BNS)

No communication made in good faith is an offence merely because it causes harm to the person to whom it is made, if made for the benefit of that person.

Significance: The General Exceptions are a complete code in themselves. Every offence under the IPC/BNS is read subject to these exceptions. The accused need not specifically plead an exception; the court is bound to consider it if the evidence supports it.

Introduction

Chapter VI of the IPC (Sections 121-130) deals with offences against the State. These are among the most serious offences in criminal law, as they threaten the sovereignty, integrity, and security of the nation. The BNS reorganises these provisions and, notably, replaces the colonial-era sedition provision with a new offence related to acts endangering sovereignty.

Waging War Against the Government of India (Section 121 IPC / Section 147 BNS)

Whoever wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.

The expression "waging war" has been interpreted broadly. It does not require a formal declaration of war. Any insurrection or rebellion aimed at overawing the government by use of criminal force qualifies. In State v. Navjot Sandhu (Parliament Attack Case, 2005), the Supreme Court held that an attack on Parliament House by armed terrorists amounted to waging war against the Government of India. The essential ingredients are: (a) an assembly of persons, (b) with arms or in a manner that constitutes a show of criminal force, (c) with the intention to overawe the government.

Mere gathering of people or even a riot does not amount to waging war unless there is a common object to overthrow or overawe the government.

Conspiracy to Wage War (Section 121A IPC / Section 148 BNS)

Whoever within or without India conspires to commit the offence of waging war, or to overawe the Central or State Government by means of criminal force, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or imprisonment up to ten years, and fine.

Sedition (Section 124A IPC) - Now Modified in BNS

Section 124A of the IPC, which criminalised "sedition," has been one of the most debated provisions. It punished whoever brought or attempted to bring into hatred or contempt, or excited or attempted to excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in India. The punishment extended to imprisonment for life.

Key judicial interpretations:

• In Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Section 124A but read it down, holding that mere criticism of the government, even strongly worded, does not constitute sedition. Only speech or writing that has the tendency to incite violence or create public disorder falls within the section.
• The Court drew a distinction between "disapprobation" (disapproval, which is permissible) and "disaffection" (disloyalty tending towards violence, which is punishable).

Replacement in BNS (Section 150 BNS): The BNS does not retain the offence of "sedition" as such. Instead, Section 150 creates a new offence of acts endangering sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India. It punishes whoever purposely or knowingly, by words, signs, electronic communication, or otherwise, excites or attempts to excite secession, armed rebellion, or subversive activities, or encourages feelings of separatist activities, or endangers sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India. The key distinction from old Section 124A is the focus on acts that endanger sovereignty or incite armed rebellion, rather than the broader concept of "disaffection."

Collecting Arms for Waging War (Section 122 IPC / Section 149 BNS)

Whoever collects men, arms, or ammunition, or otherwise prepares to wage war against the Government, shall be punished with imprisonment for life or up to ten years, and fine.

Assaulting the President or Governor (Section 124 IPC / Section 151 BNS)

Assault or criminal force on the President or Governor with intent to compel or restrain the exercise of lawful power is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine.

Waging War Against an Asiatic Power in Alliance with India (Section 125 IPC)

This provision punishes waging war against a power allied with the Government of India. This extends India's criminal jurisdiction to protect its international obligations.

Significance: These offences carry some of the severest penalties in the criminal law. Cases under these provisions are tried by the Court of Session. Many of these offences are non-bailable and non-compoundable. The BNS has modernised several of these provisions to address contemporary security threats, including cyber-related threats to sovereignty.

Overview

Chapter VIII of the IPC (Sections 141-160) deals with offences against public tranquility. These provisions address situations where groups of people engage in conduct that threatens public peace and order. The BNS retains these offences with some reorganisation.

Unlawful Assembly (Section 141 IPC / Section 189 BNS)

An assembly of five or more persons is designated an "unlawful assembly" if the common object of the persons composing it is:

• (a) To overawe by criminal force the Central or State Government, Legislature, or any public servant
• (b) To resist the execution of any law or legal process
• (c) To commit any mischief or criminal trespass
• (d) To enforce any right or supposed right by means of criminal force
• (e) To compel any person to do or abstain from doing what he is not legally bound to do

The key concept is the "common object" of the assembly. Every member of an unlawful assembly is liable for acts done in prosecution of the common object (constructive liability under Section 149 IPC / Section 190 BNS). A person joining an assembly knowing it to be unlawful is also guilty. The common object may be formed at any time before or during the assembly.

Distinction Between Common Object and Common Intention: "Common object" under Section 149 requires mere membership of the assembly, while "common intention" under Section 34 requires a shared intention and pre-arranged plan with active participation. The number required under Section 149 is five or more; Section 34 can apply to even two persons. In Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (1925), the distinction was clarified.

Rioting (Section 146-148 IPC / Section 191 BNS)

When an unlawful assembly or any member thereof uses force or violence in prosecution of the common object, every member of such assembly is guilty of rioting. The punishment is imprisonment up to two years, with or without fine. If rioting is committed with a deadly weapon, the punishment increases to up to three years.

Promoting Enmity Between Groups (Section 153A IPC / Section 196 BNS)

This provision punishes anyone who promotes or attempts to promote disharmony, feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different religious, racial, language, or regional groups, or castes or communities. It also covers acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony. Words, signs, visible representations, electronic communications, or any other means may constitute the offence.

The punishment is up to three years imprisonment and fine. If committed in a place of worship, the punishment extends up to five years.

This section must be read with Article 19(2) of the Constitution, which allows reasonable restrictions on free speech in the interest of public order. Courts have consistently held that the restriction must be based on a proximate and not remote connection to public disorder.

Statements Conducing to Public Mischief (Section 505 IPC / Section 197 BNS)

This covers the making, publishing, or circulating of any statement, rumour, or report with intent to cause or which is likely to cause: (a) mutiny or offence against the state by any section of the armed forces, (b) fear or alarm to the public, or (c) incitement of any class or community to commit offences against another. The BNS has updated these provisions to explicitly cover electronic and social media communications.

Affray (Section 159-160 IPC / Section 195 BNS)

When two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace, they are said to commit an affray. This differs from rioting in that only two persons are needed, and it must occur in a public place. The punishment is imprisonment up to one month, or fine up to one hundred rupees, or both.

Harbouring Persons Engaged in Waging War or Committing Offences Against Public Tranquility

Knowingly harbouring persons who have waged or are about to wage war against the Government or who are part of an unlawful assembly is also punishable under these provisions.

Practical Significance

These provisions are frequently invoked in situations involving communal riots, mob violence, political protests that turn violent, and group criminal activities. The concept of "constructive liability" under Section 149 is particularly important in criminal law as it makes every member of an unlawful assembly vicariously liable for offences committed by any member in prosecution of the common object. The Supreme Court in Masalti v. State of UP (1965) held that a person may become a member of an unlawful assembly by joining at any stage, and need not be present from the beginning.

Culpable Homicide and Murder

The distinction between culpable homicide and murder is one of the most tested topics in criminal law examinations.

Culpable Homicide (Section 299 IPC / Section 100 BNS): Whoever causes death by doing an act: (a) with the intention of causing death, (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (c) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death, is said to commit culpable homicide.

Murder (Section 300 IPC / Section 101 BNS): Culpable homicide is murder if the act is done: (a) with the intention of causing death, (b) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death of the person, (c) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or (d) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death.

Key Distinction: Every murder is culpable homicide, but not every culpable homicide is murder. The difference lies in the degree of intention and knowledge. As the Supreme Court explained in Reg v. Govinda (1876), the degrees of culpability distinguish the two: (a) the intention to cause death makes it murder, (b) the intention to cause an injury that the offender knows is likely to cause death makes it murder, (c) the intention to cause injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death makes it murder, and (d) knowledge of imminent danger makes it murder.

Culpable homicide not amounting to murder (Section 304 IPC / Section 105 BNS) is punished with imprisonment for life or up to ten years. Murder is punished with death or imprisonment for life and fine.

Exceptions to Murder (reducing murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder):

There are five exceptions under Section 300 IPC / Section 101 BNS:

1. Grave and sudden provocation - loss of self-control due to grave and sudden provocation

2. Exceeding right of private defence in good faith without premeditation

3. Public servant exceeding authority - acting in good faith in furtherance of duty

4. Sudden fight in the heat of passion without premeditation

5. Consent - when the deceased being above 18 years consented to death

Hurt and Grievous Hurt

Hurt (Section 319 IPC / Section 114 BNS): Whoever causes bodily pain, disease, or infirmity to any person is said to cause hurt. Simple hurt is punishable with imprisonment up to one year, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both.

Grievous Hurt (Section 320 IPC / Section 115 BNS): The following kinds of hurt are designated as "grievous": (a) emasculation, (b) permanent privation of the sight of either eye, (c) permanent privation of the hearing of either ear, (d) privation of any member or joint, (e) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint, (f) permanent disfiguration of the head or face, (g) fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth, (h) any hurt which endangers life or causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or unable to follow ordinary pursuits for twenty days.

Voluntarily causing grievous hurt is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine. If caused by a dangerous weapon or means, the punishment extends to imprisonment for life or up to ten years.

Causing Death by Negligence (Section 304A IPC / Section 106 BNS)

Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both. The BNS has enhanced the punishment to up to five years in certain circumstances.

The essential elements are: (a) death of a person, (b) the death was caused by the act of the accused, (c) the act was rash or negligent, and (d) the act did not amount to culpable homicide (i.e., there was no intention to cause death or knowledge that death would likely result).

In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005), the Supreme Court laid down guidelines for criminal prosecution of medical professionals for negligence, requiring "gross negligence" or "recklessness" beyond mere error of judgment.

Dowry Death (Section 304B IPC / Section 80 BNS)

Where the death of a woman is caused by burns, bodily injury, or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in connection with a demand for dowry, such death shall be called "dowry death." The punishment is imprisonment for not less than seven years, extendable to imprisonment for life. Under Section 113B of the Evidence Act (now BSA), a presumption is raised against the husband and his relatives.

Theft (Section 378 IPC / Section 303 BNS)

Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any moveable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft. The five essential elements are: (1) dishonest intention, (2) the property must be moveable, (3) the property must be taken out of the possession of another, (4) without consent of the possessor, and (5) there must be some moving of the property.

The punishment for theft is imprisonment up to three years, or fine, or both (Section 379 IPC / Section 303 BNS). Theft in a dwelling house, or by a clerk or servant, or after preparation for causing death, hurt, or restraint, carries enhanced punishment.

Extortion (Section 383 IPC / Section 308 BNS)

Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury and thereby dishonestly induces that person to deliver any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits extortion. The distinction from theft is that in extortion, the victim delivers the property due to fear, whereas in theft, the property is taken without consent. The distinction from robbery is discussed below.

Punishment: imprisonment up to three years, or fine, or both (Section 384 IPC / Section 308 BNS).

Robbery (Section 390 IPC / Section 309 BNS)

Robbery is an aggravated form of either theft or extortion. Theft becomes robbery when the offender, for the purpose of committing theft or carrying away property, voluntarily causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, or wrongful restraint, or puts the victim in fear of instant death, hurt, or wrongful restraint. Similarly, extortion becomes robbery when the offender puts the victim in fear of instant death, hurt, or restraint and thereby induces the delivery of property at the time and place.

Punishment: rigorous imprisonment up to ten years and fine. If committed on a highway between sunset and sunrise, the punishment extends to fourteen years (Section 392-393 IPC / Section 309 BNS).

Dacoity (Section 391 IPC / Section 310 BNS)

When five or more persons conjointly commit or attempt to commit robbery, every such person is said to commit dacoity. The number "five" is essential. If one of the five persons dies during the act, it may cease to be dacoity. Dacoity with murder carries a punishment of death or imprisonment for life and fine.

Punishment: imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment up to ten years, and fine (Section 395 IPC / Section 310 BNS). Preparation for dacoity is also punishable (Section 399 IPC).

Criminal Breach of Trust (Section 405 IPC / Section 316 BNS)

Whoever, being entrusted with property or with dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any direction of law or of any legal contract, commits criminal breach of trust.

The essential elements are: (1) entrustment of property, (2) the person entrusted must dishonestly misappropriate, convert, use, or dispose of the property, (3) in violation of a legal direction or contract.

The distinction from theft is important: in CBT, the property is lawfully entrusted to the accused, who then dishonestly deals with it. In theft, possession is taken without consent. Enhanced punishment applies when CBT is committed by a public servant, banker, merchant, agent, or carrier (Section 409 IPC / Section 316 BNS).

Cheating (Section 415 IPC / Section 318 BNS)

Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces that person to deliver any property, or to consent that any person shall retain property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if not so deceived, and which causes or is likely to cause damage or harm, commits cheating.

The essential elements are: (1) deception, (2) fraudulent or dishonest inducement, (3) the person deceived is induced to deliver property, consent to retention, or do/omit something, (4) the act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage.

Cheating by impersonation (Section 416 IPC / Section 319 BNS) is a specific form where a person cheats by pretending to be some other person.

Criminal Misappropriation (Section 403 IPC / Section 314 BNS)

Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any moveable property commits criminal misappropriation. Unlike CBT, here the initial possession may be innocent (e.g., finding lost property) but the subsequent dishonest conversion is the offence.

Mischief (Section 425 IPC / Section 324 BNS)

Whoever, with intent to cause or knowing that he is likely to cause wrongful loss or damage, destroys or alters any property, commits mischief. Mischief by fire or explosive substance carries enhanced punishment.

Criminal Trespass (Section 441 IPC / Section 329 BNS)

Whoever enters or remains on property in the possession of another with intent to commit an offence, or to intimidate, insult, or annoy the possessor, commits criminal trespass. House-trespass (entering a building) and house-breaking (entering through a passage not intended for entry) carry progressively higher punishments.

Overview

The IPC (and now the BNS) contains several provisions that specifically target misconduct by public servants. These provisions recognise that persons holding positions of public trust have a higher obligation to act lawfully and honestly, and that their misconduct is more harmful to society than similar acts by private individuals.

Definition of "Public Servant" (Section 21 IPC / Section 2(25) BNS)

The term "public servant" is defined broadly and includes: officers in the military, naval, or air forces; judges; officers of courts of justice; jurymen and assessors; arbitrators; officers authorised to place or keep any person in confinement; officers of government whose duty is to prevent offences, give information, or bring offenders to justice; officers charged with the duty of collecting, receiving, or disbursing public money; officers responsible for public property; municipal officers; election officers; and every person in the service of the government or a local authority. The BNS has expanded this definition to cover persons employed in entities receiving government financial aid.

Key Offences

1. Public Servant Taking Gratification Other Than Legal Remuneration (Section 161 IPC - now covered primarily by the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988)

The original IPC provisions on bribery (Sections 161-165A) have been largely superseded by the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), 1988, as amended in 2018. The PCA defines bribery more comprehensively and prescribes stricter penalties. Under the PCA, any public servant who obtains or accepts any undue advantage with the intention of performing or abstaining from performing a public duty improperly is punishable with imprisonment of three to seven years and fine.

2. Public Servant Disobeying Law (Section 166 IPC / Section 221 BNS)

A public servant who knowingly disobeys any direction of law as to the way in which he is to conduct himself as a public servant, intending to cause or knowing it to be likely to cause injury to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment up to one year, or fine, or both.

3. Public Servant Framing Incorrect Document (Section 167 IPC / Section 222 BNS)

A public servant who, being charged with the preparation or translation of any document, frames or translates it incorrectly, intending to cause or knowing it likely to cause injury, is punishable with imprisonment up to three years, or fine, or both.

4. Public Servant Unlawfully Engaging in Trade (Section 168 IPC / Section 223 BNS)

A public servant who, being legally bound not to engage in trade, engages in trade, is punishable with simple imprisonment up to one year, or fine, or both.

5. Public Servant Unlawfully Buying or Bidding for Property (Section 169 IPC / Section 224 BNS)

A public servant who, in his official capacity, is prohibited from buying property and still buys or bids for it, is punishable.

6. Personating a Public Servant (Section 170 IPC / Section 225 BNS)

Whoever pretends to hold a particular office as a public servant, knowing that he does not hold such office, or falsely personates another person holding such office, and in such assumed character does or attempts to do any act under colour of such office, shall be punished with imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both.

7. Public Servant Causing Disappearance of Evidence (Section 201 IPC / Section 238 BNS)

A public servant who causes any evidence of an offence to disappear with the intention of screening the offender is punishable with enhanced penalties beyond what applies to ordinary persons.

8. Torture by Public Servant to Extract Confession (Section 330-331 IPC / Sections 118-119 BNS)

Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession or information carries imprisonment up to seven years (for hurt) or ten years (for grievous hurt). The BNS has maintained and in some cases enhanced these provisions.

Enhanced Punishment

The IPC/BNS principle is that when an offence is committed by a public servant, the punishment is generally enhanced. For example, CBT by a public servant (Section 409 IPC / Section 316(3) BNS) carries imprisonment for life or up to ten years, compared to three years for ordinary CBT. Cheating committed by a public servant attracts enhanced punishment. The rationale is that a public servant owes a duty of trust to the public and breach of that trust warrants severer penalties.

Constitutional Safeguards

Article 311 of the Constitution provides safeguards to civil servants against arbitrary dismissal, requiring an inquiry before removal. However, exceptions exist where inquiry is not practicable (e.g., cases involving national security). The Prevention of Corruption Act requires prior sanction from the appropriate authority before a public servant can be prosecuted, serving as a safeguard against frivolous prosecution.

Definition and Essential Elements

Defamation under the IPC (Sections 499-502) and BNS (Sections 356-359) is a criminal offence, distinct from civil defamation under tort law. This dual remedy (both civil and criminal) for defamation is a distinctive feature of Indian law, unlike many common law jurisdictions where defamation is primarily a civil wrong.

Section 499 IPC / Section 356 BNS defines defamation: Whoever, by words either spoken or intended to be read, or by signs, or by visible representations, makes or publishes any imputation concerning any person, intending to harm or knowing or having reason to believe that such imputation will harm the reputation of that person, is said to defame that person.

Essential Elements:

1. Imputation - There must be an imputation (a statement attributing something to a person)

2. Publication - The imputation must be communicated to a third party. Private communication to the person defamed alone is not defamation

3. Reference to a specific person - The imputation must refer to an identifiable person. The person need not be named if they are identifiable from the context

4. Intention or knowledge - The maker must intend to harm or know that harm to reputation is likely

5. Lowering reputation - The imputation must lower the moral or intellectual character of the person, or lower the character of the person with respect to his caste, calling, or credit

Explanations to Section 499:

• An imputation concerning a deceased person is defamation if it would harm the reputation of that person if living, and is intended to hurt the feelings of his family or near relatives.
• An imputation may be made by alternative or in the form of an insinuation.
• An imputation in the form of a question or exclamation can also constitute defamation.
• A publication of a defamatory imputation on printed or electronic matter is treated as making the imputation.

Punishment (Section 500 IPC / Section 357 BNS): Simple imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both. It is a non-cognizable, bailable, and compoundable offence, triable by a Magistrate.

Ten Exceptions (Defences):

The law provides ten exceptions where an imputation does not amount to defamation:

1. Truth for public good - It is not defamation to impute anything which is true if the imputation is made for the public good. The person claiming this defence must prove both truth and public interest.

2. Public conduct of public servants - Any opinion respecting the conduct of a public servant in the discharge of public functions, or respecting his character so far as it appears in that conduct, is protected.

3. Conduct of any person touching a public question - An opinion respecting the conduct of any person touching a public question and his character so far as it appears in that conduct is protected.

4. Publication of court proceedings - A substantially true report of court proceedings is protected.

5. Merits of a case decided by court - An opinion on the merits of a case decided by a court, or the conduct of parties, witnesses, or officers as such, is protected.

6. Merits of public performance - An opinion respecting the merits of any performance submitted to public judgment is protected.

7. Censure by a person in authority - Censure passed in good faith by a person having authority over another is protected.

8. Complaint to authority - An accusation preferred in good faith to a person having lawful authority is protected.

9. Imputation for protection of one's own or other's interests - An imputation made in good faith for the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person, or for the public good, is protected.

10. Caution in good faith - A caution intended for the good of the person to whom it is conveyed, or for the public good, is protected.

Constitutional Validity: In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation (Sections 499-500 IPC), holding that the right to reputation is a fundamental right under Article 21 and that criminal defamation constitutes a reasonable restriction on free speech under Article 19(2). The Court rejected arguments that criminal defamation has a "chilling effect" on free speech.

Criminal Intimidation (Section 503 IPC / Section 351 BNS)

Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation, or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, commits criminal intimidation.

The essential elements are: (1) threatening a person with injury to person, reputation, or property, (2) the threat must be made with the intent to cause alarm or to compel the person to do or omit something.

Punishment: Imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both (Section 506 IPC / Section 351 BNS). If the threat is to cause death, grievous hurt, destruction of property by fire, imputation of unchastity, or offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, the punishment extends to seven years.

Abetment (Sections 107-120 IPC / Sections 45-62 BNS)

A person abets an offence when he: (a) instigates any person to commit that offence, (b) engages with one or more persons in a conspiracy to commit an offence if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, or (c) intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the commission of that offence.

Three Forms of Abetment:

1. Instigation: Actively suggesting, encouraging, or provoking another to commit an offence. Instigation may be by words, gestures, or conduct. Mere presence at the scene is not instigation. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001), the Court held that abetment of suicide requires a positive act of instigation or intentional aid.

2. Conspiracy: When two or more persons agree to do an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means, and some act or omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, each conspirator is guilty of abetment. Mere agreement without an overt act is not sufficient for abetment by conspiracy (though it may be sufficient for the substantive offence of criminal conspiracy under Section 120A/120B).

3. Intentional Aiding: Deliberately facilitating the commission of an offence by doing an act or making an omission. The aid must be intentional, not accidental. Example: A servant intentionally leaving the door open for a thief.

Punishment for Abetment:

• If the offence abetted is committed: same punishment as the principal offender (Section 109 IPC / Section 49 BNS)
• If the offence is not committed but the abettor has conspired: punishment up to one-fourth of the maximum punishment for the offence (Section 120B IPC)
• Abetment of an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, if the offence is not committed: imprisonment up to seven years and fine (Section 115 IPC / Section 58 BNS)
• Abetment of suicide: imprisonment up to ten years and fine (Section 306 IPC / Section 103 BNS)

Criminal Conspiracy (Section 120A-120B IPC / Sections 61-62 BNS)

Criminal conspiracy is defined as an agreement between two or more persons to do or cause to be done: (a) an illegal act, or (b) an act which is not illegal by illegal means. When the object is an offence, mere agreement constitutes the offence of criminal conspiracy. When the object is not an offence but is to be achieved by illegal means, some act besides the agreement must be done.

The key distinction between criminal conspiracy and abetment by conspiracy is: criminal conspiracy is a substantive offence and is complete upon the meeting of minds (agreement); abetment by conspiracy requires an overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy.

Punishment: If the conspiracy is to commit a serious offence (punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or rigorous imprisonment of two years or more), the conspirator is punished in the same manner as if he had abetted the offence. Otherwise, imprisonment up to six months, or fine, or both.

Attempt (Section 511 IPC / Section 62 BNS)

Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment (other than offences where attempt itself is separately punishable, like attempt to murder under Section 307), and does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall be punished with imprisonment up to one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for the offence, or with the fine provided, or both.

The distinction between preparation and attempt is crucial: preparation involves arranging means; attempt is the direct movement towards commission after preparation is complete. In Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar (1961), the Court held that an act constitutes an attempt if it goes beyond mere preparation and is a step towards the commission of the offence.

General Provision on Attempt (Section 511 IPC / Section 62 BNS)

The IPC deals with "attempt" in two ways: (a) specific provisions punishing attempt to commit particular offences (e.g., Section 307 - attempt to murder, Section 308 - attempt to commit culpable homicide, Section 393 - attempt to commit robbery), and (b) the general provision under Section 511 which covers attempts to commit offences for which no specific provision for attempt exists.

Section 511 IPC / Section 62 BNS provides: Whoever attempts to commit an offence punishable by the Code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is made by the Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with imprisonment of any description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine as is provided for the offence, or with both.

Distinction Between Preparation and Attempt

This is one of the most frequently examined distinctions in criminal law:

Preparation consists of devising or arranging the means or measures necessary for the commission of an offence. Preparation alone is generally not punishable under criminal law, except in specific cases such as: preparation to wage war (Section 122 IPC), preparation to commit dacoity (Section 399 IPC), and preparation for counterfeiting (Sections 233-235 IPC).

Attempt is the direct movement towards the commission of the offence after the preparation is complete. It is the penultimate stage before the actual commission. Several tests have been proposed to distinguish preparation from attempt:

1. Proximity Test (English Law): The act must be proximate to the intended result, not merely remotely leading to it. The closer the act to the commission of the final offence, the more likely it is to be classified as an attempt.

2. Locus Poenitentiae Test: So long as the offender has the opportunity to withdraw from the criminal enterprise (locus poenitentiae or space for repentance), the act remains preparation. Once that point is crossed, it becomes an attempt.

3. The "But For" Interruption Test: If the act would have resulted in the commission of the offence "but for" some interruption or intervention beyond the offender's control, it is an attempt.

4. Social Danger / Unequivocality Test: The act must unequivocally indicate the criminal intent. If the act is equivocal (consistent with an innocent purpose), it remains preparation.

Key Cases:

In Queen v. Lizzy (1886), the accused was found approaching a haystack with a lit match. The Court held this was preparation, not attempt, as the accused had not yet applied the match to the haystack.

In Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar (1961), the accused submitted a false application claiming to be a graduate to appear for an examination. The Supreme Court held that this was an attempt to cheat, not mere preparation, because the accused had done everything in his power and the final act (gaining the unfair advantage) was to follow as a natural consequence.

In State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub (1980), the accused were found at the seashore at night near a truck containing silver, apparently waiting for a boat for smuggling. The Supreme Court held that this was an attempt to export, not mere preparation, as the accused had crossed the stage of preparation and were about to execute their plan.

Attempt to Commit Murder (Section 307 IPC / Section 109 BNS)

This is a specifically defined offence: whoever does any act with the intention or knowledge that if the act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, is guilty of attempt to murder, regardless of whether any hurt is actually caused. The punishment is imprisonment up to ten years and fine. If hurt is caused, the punishment may extend to imprisonment for life. If the attempt is by a life convict, the punishment may be death.

In State of Maharashtra v. Balram Bama Patil (1983), the Court held that to constitute an offence under Section 307, it is not essential that bodily injury must have been inflicted. The nature of the weapon used, the part of the body aimed at, and the intention are all relevant.

Impossible Attempts: Indian law does not explicitly address "impossible attempts" (e.g., attempting to steal from an empty pocket, or shooting at a dead body believing it to be alive). However, the prevailing view, supported by Section 511, is that if the accused has done an act towards the commission of an offence with the requisite intention, the fact that the offence was factually impossible to complete does not prevent liability for attempt.

Foundation (Sections 96-106 IPC / Sections 34-44 BNS)

The right of private defence is one of the most important general exceptions in criminal law. It recognises every person's inherent right to protect their body, property, and the body and property of others against criminal aggression. As the Supreme Court observed in Vidhya Singh v. State of MP (1971), the right of private defence is a right born out of necessity and exists where the state machinery is not immediately available to protect the citizen.

General Principles (Section 96-98 IPC / Sections 34-36 BNS)

• Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of the right of private defence (Section 96).
• Every person has a right to defend their own body and property, and the body and property of any other person, against an offence (Section 97).
• The right is available against acts of persons of unsound mind, intoxicated persons, and children (Section 98), as the right is against the act, not the person.

Right of Private Defence of the Body (Sections 100-101 IPC / Sections 37-38 BNS)

The right extends to causing death of the aggressor in the following six situations (Section 100):

1. An assault that reasonably causes the apprehension of death

2. An assault that reasonably causes apprehension of grievous hurt

3. An assault with the intention of committing rape

4. An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust

5. An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abduction

6. An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person where the defender reasonably apprehends inability to seek recourse to public authorities

In all other cases, the right of private defence of the body does not extend to causing death but extends to causing any harm short of death (Section 101).

Right of Private Defence of Property (Sections 103-104 IPC / Sections 40-41 BNS)

The right extends to causing death in four situations (Section 103):

1. Robbery

2. House-breaking by night

3. Mischief by fire to any building, tent, or vessel used as a human dwelling, or as a place for the custody of property

4. Theft, mischief, or house-trespass, under such circumstances as may reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the consequence if the right is not exercised

In all other cases, the right does not extend to causing death but extends to causing any harm short of death (Section 104).

Limitations on the Right (Sections 99, 102, 105-106 IPC / Sections 36, 39, 42-44 BNS)

1. No right against lawful acts: There is no right of private defence against an act which does not reasonably cause the apprehension of death or grievous hurt, if done by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his office (Section 99).

2. Proportionality: The harm inflicted must not be more than is necessary for the purpose of defence. The defender must use the minimum force necessary to repel the aggression. Excessive use of force will take the act outside the right of private defence.

3. Reasonable apprehension: The defender must have a reasonable apprehension of danger. It need not be shown that the apprehension was actually realised, but the apprehension must be real and not imaginary. The test is whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances would have had such apprehension.

4. No right to retaliate: The right is purely defensive. Once the danger has passed, the right ceases. Any continued use of force after the threat subsides is not private defence but retaliation, which is not protected.

5. Availability of state protection: If there is time to seek the protection of public authorities, the right is limited. However, the law does not expect mathematical precision. As the Supreme Court held in Buta Singh v. State of Punjab (1991), the defender cannot be expected to weigh the exact quantum of force in the golden scales.

Commencement and Duration (Sections 102, 105 IPC)

The right of private defence of the body commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises and continues as long as such apprehension continues. The right of private defence of property commences when a reasonable apprehension of danger to property commences and continues until the offender has either been apprehended by public authorities or has retreated.

Burden of Proof

The burden of establishing the plea of private defence is on the accused, but it is not as heavy as the burden on the prosecution. The accused need only show a preponderance of probabilities. Even if the accused does not take the plea, the court is duty-bound to consider it if the evidence on record supports it (as held in Munshi Ram v. Delhi Administration, 1968).

Key Cases:

• Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2010): The Supreme Court outlined the principles: there must be a reasonable apprehension, the force used must be proportionate, there must be no safe retreat available, and the right cannot extend to taking revenge.
• Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat (1980): The right of private defence is available even if the defender is a trespasser, if he is subjected to an attack likely to cause death or grievous hurt.

Introduction

The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, received Presidential assent on 25 December 2023, and came into effect on 1 July 2024, replacing the Indian Penal Code of 1860. The BNS retains many core principles of the IPC but introduces significant structural, substantive, and procedural changes. Understanding these differences is essential for law students as both the old and new frameworks may be tested in examinations.

Structural Changes

• The IPC had 511 sections arranged in 23 chapters. The BNS has 358 sections arranged in 20 chapters.
• The BNS reorganises the sequence of offences. Offences against the State and against women and children are given more prominence by being placed earlier in the code.
• Several redundant or obsolete provisions have been removed.
• Section numbering is entirely new, so students must familiarise themselves with the new section numbers.

Key Substantive Changes

1. Sedition Replaced (IPC Section 124A vs BNS Section 150)

The colonial-era offence of "sedition" has been removed. In its place, the BNS introduces Section 150, which targets acts endangering the sovereignty, unity, and integrity of India. The new provision is narrower in scope, focusing on acts that excite secession, armed rebellion, or subversive activities, rather than the vague concept of "disaffection."

2. Community Service as Punishment (BNS Section 4)

The BNS introduces "community service" as a new form of punishment for petty offences such as attempted suicide (where the person is terminally ill), minor theft, defamation by words in heat of moment, and other minor offences. This is a significant reform aimed at reducing the burden on prisons.

3. Organised Crime (BNS Section 111)

The BNS introduces a dedicated provision for organised crime, covering activities like extortion, land grabbing, contract killing, cyber crime, and economic offences carried out by syndicates. This was not specifically addressed in the IPC. The punishment includes imprisonment for life or a minimum of five years and fine.

4. Terrorism (BNS Section 113)

For the first time, a provision defining and punishing "terrorism" has been included in the general criminal code. Previously, terrorism was dealt with only under special legislation like UAPA. The BNS defines terrorist acts as those done with the intent to threaten the unity, integrity, and sovereignty of India, to intimidate the general public, or to disturb public order.

5. Mob Lynching (BNS Section 103(2))

The BNS specifically addresses murder by a group of five or more persons acting on grounds of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief, or similar grounds. The punishment ranges from imprisonment for life to death, with a minimum of seven years.

6. Snatching (BNS Section 304)

Theft by snatching is separately defined and carries a more severe punishment of imprisonment up to three years.

7. Hit and Run (BNS Section 106(2))

The BNS introduces an enhanced punishment for causing death by rash or negligent driving and fleeing the scene without reporting. The punishment is imprisonment up to ten years and fine, compared to two years under the old Section 304A IPC.

8. Sexual Offences Against Women

The BNS introduces stricter provisions for gang rape of a woman under 18 years (BNS Section 70(2)), with a minimum punishment of imprisonment for life extending to death. Deceitful sexual intercourse through false promise of marriage is specifically criminalised (BNS Section 69).

9. Adultery (IPC Section 497 - Omitted in BNS)

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018) striking down Section 497 IPC, the BNS does not include adultery as a criminal offence.

10. Attempt to Suicide (IPC Section 309 vs BNS Section 226)

Under the IPC, attempt to commit suicide was punishable. The BNS decriminalises attempted suicide generally but retains it only when used as a means to compel or restrain a public servant from discharging duty.

Procedural Implications

• The BNS works alongside the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 (replacing CrPC) and the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam (BSA), 2023 (replacing the Indian Evidence Act).
• Zero FIR and e-FIR provisions are introduced.
• Mandatory forensic investigation for offences punishable with seven years or more.
• Time-bound trials: charge sheet to be filed within 90 days; trial to be completed within stipulated periods.

Transition Provisions

Acts committed before 1 July 2024 are governed by the IPC, while acts committed on or after that date are governed by the BNS. The principle of beneficial interpretation (applying whichever law is more favourable to the accused) may apply in transitional cases involving continuing offences.

Study Tip: Students should maintain a comparative chart mapping IPC sections to their BNS equivalents, as courts and examiners will expect familiarity with both frameworks during the transition period.

Key Judicial Pronouncements

1. K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra (1962)

This was the last jury trial in India. Naval Commander Nanavati shot his wife's lover. The jury acquitted him, but the Bombay High Court set aside the verdict and convicted him of murder. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, holding that there was no "grave and sudden provocation" as the accused had time to cool down between learning of the affair and the shooting. The case also led to the abolition of the jury system in India.

2. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980)

The Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the death penalty but held that it should be imposed only in the "rarest of rare" cases. The Court laid down factors to consider: the aggravating circumstances of the crime and the mitigating circumstances of the offender. This "rarest of rare" doctrine continues to guide sentencing in capital cases.

3. Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab (1983)

Elaborated on the "rarest of rare" doctrine from Bachan Singh. The Court identified categories where the death penalty may be appropriate: manner of commission (extremely brutal, diabolical), motive (total depravity and meanness), socially abhorrent nature, magnitude of crime, and personality of the victim (innocent, helpless).

4. State of Rajasthan v. Shera Ram (2012)

Addressed the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The Court reiterated that the distinction depends on the degree of probability of death: if death is the most probable result, it is murder under clause (c) of Section 300.

5. Sushil Kumar v. State of Punjab (2009)

The Court comprehensively discussed the distinction between murder and culpable homicide, illustrating with examples the operation of different clauses of Sections 299 and 300.

6. Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar (1962)

The Supreme Court upheld the validity of Section 124A IPC (sedition) but read it down. Only speech or writing that has a tendency to incite violence or create public disorder falls within sedition. Mere strong criticism of the government is not sedition. This interpretation narrowed the scope of the offence considerably.

7. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)

The Supreme Court struck down Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which penalised sending "offensive" messages electronically, as unconstitutional for violating freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). The Court distinguished between "discussion," "advocacy," and "incitement" and held that only incitement to imminent lawless action can be restricted.

8. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)

A five-judge Constitution bench struck down Section 377 IPC insofar as it criminalised consensual sexual acts between adults of the same sex. The Court held that sexual orientation is intrinsic to personal liberty, dignity, and privacy under Article 21.

9. Joseph Shine v. Union of India (2018)

The Supreme Court struck down Section 497 IPC (adultery) as unconstitutional, holding that it was based on an archaic notion that the wife is the "property" of the husband and violated Articles 14, 15, and 21.

10. Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India (2016)

Upheld the constitutional validity of criminal defamation (Sections 499-500 IPC), holding that reputation is a fundamental right under Article 21 and criminal defamation is a reasonable restriction on free speech under Article 19(2).

11. Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab (2005)

Laid down guidelines for criminal prosecution of doctors for medical negligence. The Court held that simple negligence is not enough; there must be "gross negligence" or "recklessness" to attract criminal liability under Section 304A IPC. A mere error of judgment does not constitute criminal negligence.

12. Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar (2014)

The Supreme Court directed that police must comply with Section 41A CrPC (notice of appearance) before arresting any person accused of an offence punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. The Court deplored the widespread practice of unnecessary arrests and mandated that the Magistrate must satisfy himself that the arrest conditions are met before authorising detention.

13. State v. Navjot Sandhu (Parliament Attack Case, 2005)

The Court convicted the accused for conspiracy to wage war against India. It clarified the law on circumstantial evidence, confessions, and abetment. The Court held that a conspiracy can be proved by circumstantial evidence and that direct evidence of agreement is rarely available.

14. Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP (2014)

The Supreme Court held that registration of FIR under Section 154 CrPC is mandatory when information discloses commission of a cognizable offence. The police cannot conduct a preliminary inquiry before registering the FIR if cognizable offence is apparent. However, a preliminary inquiry is permissible in categories like matrimonial disputes, commercial offences, and medical negligence.

15. Joginder Kumar v. State of UP (1994)

The Supreme Court laid down guidelines to prevent arbitrary arrests: an arrested person has the right to have one friend, relative, or well-wisher informed of the arrest, and the police officer must inform the arrested person of this right.